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Aos meus pais, Isabel e Júlio, 
Aos meus tios, Helena e Sten,  
E aos meus padrinhos, Arcelina e Gilberto. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Peace 
What’s peace? Now first of all it’s really 
Not a simple issue of no-war. 
It’s no-injustice, no-intolerance, no-hatred. 
It’s thinking good not bad of everyone. 
 
It recognizes one humanity 
In which all lives are precious 
And worthy to be loved and given help 
Towards fulfilment. 
 
Peace is an inner state 
Reflected outwardly in actions, 
In loving care for anyone in need, 
Its qualities are wisdom and compassion. 
 
Our work for peace is work for harmony 
Among all beings. Through peace 
We pray that God’s will may be done 
On earth as it is in heaven. 
- Adam Curle 
  
  
Agradecimentos 
 
Agradeço a Isabel Tavares, pela cuidadosa orientação. A Sten Harck, pelo precioso apoio. 
A Manuel Graça, pelas valiosas fontes. A todos, pela troca de ideias. 
A Marshall Rosenberg, pela inspiração e legado.  
 
 
Agradeço também 
Aos meus pais e às minhas irmãs, que são os maiores pilares da minha vida. 
Aos meus padrinhos Arcelina e Beto, que tanto estimo e que tão bem cuidam de mim. 
Aos meus amigos, em especial, à Sofia, à Maria, ao Diogo, à Inês e ao Herlander, que me 
ensinam que o Tempo tem um valor e com quem o Tempo tudo vale. 
 
 
O agradecimento mais especial faço à minha tia Helena. Não existem palavras que façam 
jus à bondade e ao carinho que marcam a nossa relação. Aprendi que a Família é uma 
constelação ancestral e que os laços desta vida podem ser tão imensos quanto o Amor.  
 Resumo  
Na presente dissertação propomo-nos a explorar a possibilidade do desenvolvimento de 
um regime jurídico vinculativo, que possa ser desencadeado em contextos de crises 
humanitárias. O objetivo será agir eficazmente para prevenir a erupção ou escalada da 
violência e de conflitos armados. Em termos legais, é discutido se tal parâmetro 
preventivo já existe e, consequentemente, se as normas jurídicas internacionais impõem 
um dever à comunidade internacional de reagir perante graves violações de Direitos 
Humanos perpetradas pelos Governos. Concluímos que tal regime normativo existe, 
emanando do princípio da ‘Responsabilidade de Proteger’ e do dever de cooperação 
estabelecido no Projeto de Artigos sobre a Responsabilidade dos Estados. No entanto, 
carece de força vinculativa. Um dos obstáculos à adoção pelos Estados de regimes de 
prevenção de conflitos vinculativos tem sido a sua conotação com a intervenção militar 
para fins humanitários. Por este motivo, pretendemos reforçar a importância da prevenção 
de conflitos em contextos anteriores à comissão de grandes atrocidades. Damos ênfase à 
Mediação como método de prevenção de conflitos com especial relevância em contextos 
de conflitos internos. Analisamos a crise na Venezuela e a possibilidade da emergência 
de um costume internacional que valide a prática da Mediação como norma legal. A nossa 
análise assenta numa abordagem interdisciplinar, colhendo ensinamentos das Relações 
Internacionais, bem como (ainda que em menor extensão) dos Estudos da Paz e da 
Psicologia.  
Palavras-chave: Responsabilidade de Proteger; Dever de Cooperação, Mediação; 
Prevenção de Conflitos; Venezuela. 
 
Abstract 
This thesis explores the possibility of developing a legally binding framework for conflict 
prevention, that could be enacted in contexts of humanitarian crisis. The goal would be 
to act effectively to prevent the eruption or escalation of violence and armed conflicts. 
We discuss, in legal terms, whether such a preventive framework already exists. 
Moreover, whether general norms of International Law impose on States a duty to react 
to grave violations of Human Rights conducted by Governments. We conclude that such 
a regime exists and emanates from the principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and from 
the duty of cooperation established under the ICL’s Draft Articles. However, the regime 
lacks binding character. One obstacle to the adoption by States of legally binding 
mechanisms for conflict prevention is the fact that the latter has been associated with 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes. For this reason, we intend to reinforce 
the importance of conflict prevention in contexts prior to the commission of mass 
atrocities. Mediation is emphasised as a conflict prevention method with special 
relevance in contexts of internal conflict. We analyse the Venezuelan crisis and the 
possibility of emergence of a customary norm, which validates the practise of Mediation 
as a legal rule. We conduct an interdisciplinary analysis, retrieving lessons from 
International Relations, as well as – to a lesser extent – Peace Studies and Psychology.  
Keywords:  Responsibility to Protect; Duty of Cooperation; Mediation; Conflict 
Prevention; Venezuela. 
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Preface/ Prefácio 
 
Neste prefácio, vou resumir, utilizando linguagem leiga e de forma sucinta, o pensamento 
subjacente nesta prova científica. A paz impõe-se de dentro para fora. Isto significa que 
uma verdadeira paz, a paz positiva, se alcança quando se adereçam as raízes dos conflitos. 
Os mecanismos que desencadeiam a Paz são preferencialmente ativados antes do escalar 
da violência. A isso se chama a prevenção de conflitos. A empatia pode ser aprendida e 
desenvolvida nas diferentes esferas de atuação social - desde as relações interpessoais, às 
do indivíduo com as instituições de autoridade e destas entre si, até ás relações entre 
entidades supranacionais e internacionais. A Mediação é um mecanismo utilizado pela 
humanidade desde tempos imemoriais. Porém, não está devidamente regulada no Direito 
Internacional. Por este motivo, nem sempre se faz Mediação de uma forma adequada, 
atempada ou eficaz. Ainda assim, na pior das hipóteses, a mediação contribui para o início 
de uma relação de comunicação entre as partes. Na melhor, resolve o conflito de forma 
definita e duradoura, transformando uma realidade conflituosa numa paz positiva. As 
Nações Unidas surgem como um potencial Messias, o garante da manutenção de uma paz 
sustentável. No entanto, de momento observa-se que são necessárias certas 
transformações no seio desde organismo. Tem sido corrompido pelos balanços e 
contrabalanços de poderes e interesses geopolíticos. Vivemos um momento crítico de 
rutura das relações pacíficas com repercussões muito gravosas para a humanidade. Urge-
se que as Nações se Unam em prol dos valores da vida, da segurança e da paz. Os 
mecanismos para o fazer já foram pensados nos Estudos da Paz, bem como no ramo das 
Relações Internacionais e testados na Psicologia. Adicionalmente, já existem normas 
jurídicas de Direito Internacional que os preveem. Falta que os diferentes ramos 
científicos acolham, em diálogo, as diferentes contribuições. A maior barreira ao 
desenvolvimento de estruturas sólidas de prevenção de conflitos tem sido a falta de 
vontade política para atuar preventivamente e, em paralelo, de dispor recursos financeiros 
a esse propósito. Ainda assim, nas últimas décadas tem-se verificado um crescente 
entusiasmo pela Mediação e mecanismos afins. O caso da Venezuela revela indícios de 
uma mudança de paradigma, sendo que a mediação do conflito pode ser determinante na 
operacionalização dessa tão desejada transição. O tempo para agir é muito limitado, dada 
a fragilidade da situação e a já lançada ameaça de guerra. Acredito que toda a produção 
literária e discussão pública sobre o assunto contribuam para a consciencialização social. 
As sementes das quais uma mudança de paradigma vai florescer já foram lançadas ao ar. 
Falta que cada Estado prepare o seu jardim. E esse trabalho começa na mente de cada 
indivíduo. Assim, lanço o mote que desencadeou o processo de aprendizagem que vivi 
nos últimos meses, e que desenvolvi ao longo destas páginas.  
 
Porto, outubro de 2019
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I. Introduction 
 
According to the Upsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) statistical data on global 
conflicts, in 2018, 162 conflicts1 were happening around the world, 77 of which were 
state-based violence, 52 non-state violence and 33 one-sided violence conflicts. These 
numbers are the highest since 19752.  
 Acknowledging the urgent redefinition of the International Community’s 
diplomatic approaches towards on-going and emerging conflicts around the Globe, this 
thesis aims to explore the relevance of Mediation techniques from a conflict prevention 
perspective, taking into account the legal scope of Responsibility to Protect and chapter 
VI of the United Nations Charter, entitled Pacific Settlement of Disputes.  
 The United Nations (UN) was historically assigned with a worldwide mandate of 
sustaining a durable peace. In fact, Art. 1 of the Charter of the United Nations states that 
the aim of the organization is to “maintain international peace and security”. However, 
since its creation, the United Nations has been through ups and downs in the pursuit of 
this goal3. In recent years, the Secretary-Generals have been putting their efforts into 
creating and restoring mechanisms suitable for preventing the eruption of major 
humanitarian crises and the emergence of armed conflict. It is not an easy task to find the 
necessary balance in-between the games of geopolitical interests and forces and, perhaps 
for this reason, States have been very cautious and reluctant in adopting legally binding 
solutions for conflict prevention. 
We argue that dialogue between different fields of knowledge would help the 
finding of legal solutions to the current global peace crisis. International Law and 
International Relations already have a symbiotic relationship. Additional to a more 
intensive exchange between International Law and International Relations, the 
contribution of Psychology and Peace Studies would perhaps yield success in achieving 
the desired and needed outcomes. 
 
1
 The UCDP defines conflict as the following: “An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least 
one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.” 
2
 https://ucdp.uu.se/ 
3
 Orakhelashvili, 2019, p. 25. 
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 Realities such as the one lived in Venezuela cause great damage to all mankind 
and affect international peace, security and stability. These facts are recognized by the 
international community. Despite this, concise mechanisms to react in a timely manner 
to prevent the escalation of violence haven’t yet been developed. Drawing on Conflict 
Transformation theory, this process could overcome the inherent barriers of Law, 
ultimately involving a structural reformulation of social institutions, paving the way for 
constructive and continuous dialogue between peoples and authorities.  
  Responsibility to Protect represents the first normative step in the right direction. 
In 2005 the General Assembly adopted the principle, which establishes an international 
responsibility of territorial States to protect their populations, and to cooperate in a 
complementary way, through the United Nations, to protect inhabitants of States 
incapable or unwilling to do so. Furthermore, the formulation of Responsibility to Protect 
emphasises the importance of preventive action. 
As an introductory remark, it should be noted that the principle of ‘Conflict 
Prevention’ is an evolving concept. As a discipline and policy, its scope is wide and, 
consequently, defining it is a challenge. David Carment and Albrecht Schabel4 define 
Conflict Prevention as a  
“medium and long-term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken by 
a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a 
stable and more predictable international security environment.”  
Several mechanisms suit conflict prevention purposes. In this thesis, we highlight 
Mediation as a virtuous approach to international conflict. It is a tool which enables 
dialogue among individuals, civil society and other stakeholders of the international 
community, while serving Justice and peace-making purposes. Retrieving lessons from 
the fields of knowledge of International Relations and Peace Studies, we present a brief 
insight of how a mediation process develops and how it changes conflicts’ dynamics.   
Below, we argue that the International Community should strengthen and further 
develop a legal preventive framework to respond to humanitarian crises outside the scope 
of mass atrocity crimes. Furthermore, taking into account the legal and political scholarly 
debates in the aftermath of the wars in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, it will be 
 
4
 Carment, Schabel, 2003, p. 11. 
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analysed whether, and to what extent, the International Community has an obligation to 
react to grave violations of Human Rights conducted by Governments5. 
Our assessment is threefold, and it goes from a generic and theoretical discourse to 
a more specific and practical approach. In Chapter II, we present theories about conflict 
prevention and explore the path which led to its legal conceptualization. Considerations 
about the development of the concept of sovereignty are made. Furthermore, the question 
of military intervention for humanitarian purposes is discussed. In Chapter III, we address 
Mediation as a method for the prevention of conflicts. The role mediators play and their 
influence in conflict dynamics are underscored. Finally, in Chapter IV, we try to apply 
the theoretical framework to the current Venezuelan crisis. After this analysis, we will 
conclude on the possibility to use Mediation as a means of active conflict prevention in 
the light of the principle of Responsibility to Protect.  
  
 
5
 See Nolte, 1999, p 629 ff. 
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II. Discourse on Conflict Prevention 
 
This chapter intends to specify and deepen the cornerstones of Conflict Prevention. 
For the purpose, we analysed doctrine from International Relations in order to understand 
the scope of the concept of conflict prevention. We further address both its legal and 
institutional framework within the United Nations system.  Moreover, we explore the 
question of the use of force in preventing conflicts. Finally, we will reflect on the different 
approaches taken in International Relations and International Law. From our point of 
view, only a cooperative dialogue between the two fields could lead to an effective 
preventive normative framework for the “Responsibility to Protect”. The goal should be 
to establish a broader preventive paradigm that could replace the current regime of a 
subsequent possibility of (war crime) trials at various international tribunals.  
 
1. Introducing the concept of Conflict Prevention 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the subsequent opening of the Iron 
Curtain between Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the 1990’s, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War initiated an intensive search for and discussion 
about an effective tool for conflict prevention in International Relations’ theory. In 
particular, the 1994 Rwandan massacre pushed discussions about the International 
Community’s inertia and, consequently, failure to act proactively in the face of imminent 
major humanitarian catastrophes6. In view of Art. 1 of the Charter of the United Nations 
and obligations of the United Nations to prevent such deplorable events, it became clear 
that a change of perspective was necessary and that the traditional a posteriori reaction 
paradigm (war crimes tribunals) should move further to a proactive, early and preventive 
approach.  
Starting by presenting one of our analysis’ assumptions, it is important to 
distinguish the principles of ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘atrocity prevention’ as policies. 
Whereas the latter focuses on dissuading actors from committing atrocities, the former 
aims at finding a mutually agreeable settlement. They involve different strategies, which 
often are incompatible which each other7. One crucial difference is that strategies for 
 
6
 Igrapé Institute, 2018. 
7
 Bellamy, 2018, p. 142. 
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preventing conflicts usually aim at the elimination of violence and avoiding the use of 
force, whereas atrocity prevention policies might involve the recourse to military action, 
specially at a later stage8. We will return to this topic. 
Earlier, we introduced David Carment and Albrecht Schabel’s9  definition of 
Conflict Prevention. According to this, Conflict Prevention  
“is a medium and long-term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken 
by a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a 
stable and more predictable international security environment.”  
This definition assumes that Conflict Prevention (i) involves attitudinal change, (ii) 
is malleable as a concept and as a policy, (iii) can be multi-sectoral, (iv) can be applied at 
different phases of conflict, and (v) can be implemented by a range of actors acting either 
independently or in various groups/ constellations10.  
 Moreover, the authors add the idea, which we paraphrase, that conflict prevention 
is a way of thinking, a state of mind or even a culture innate to policy makers engaged in 
implementing preventive diplomacy, be they Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), 
States, or regional and global International Organizations. 
Another underlying assumption is that conflicts are a natural expression of 
heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs, being, therefore, an intrinsically embedded 
aspect of societies from which social change arises. This means that conflicts are as much 
inevitable as they are needed and should be perceived as positive11.  The focus of conflict 
management theory and practice, as a wide theoretical field is, as scholars argue, the way 
conflicts are dealt with. One pre-requisite is, nevertheless, that habits and choices can be 
changed.  
It should be pointed out that there is a common tendency to focus on so-called ad 
hoc Conflict Prevention – actions directed at specific countries in the imminence of 
conflicts12. This is often related to the concept of negative peace – a rather limited and 
narrow definition of ‘Conflict Prevention’ in which peace is the absence of war13.  
 
8
 Sharma, Welsh, 2015, p. 9. 
9
 Carment, Schabel, 2003, p. 11. 
10
 Idem. 
11
 Ramsbotham et. al, 2005, p. 11. Mani, Ponzio, 2018.  
12
 Lund, 2009. 
13
 Diehl, 2016. 
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Another part of, conflict prevention, in a long-term perspective, even when no signs 
of conflict have emerged yet, is the adoption of global and/or region-levels conventions 
or other normative standards of Human Rights and Democracy by States14.  
Generically, all measures aimed at reducing poverty and increasing economic 
growth suit the prevention of humanitarian crisis, as does the promotion of Human Rights 
and the protection of Minorities’ Rights15. Increasing cooperation in the educational, 
health, social, cultural and related fields is also believed to decrease conflict16. This set of 
measures can be referred to as a priori conflict prevention and one illustrative direct 
action would be the creation of international courts such as the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), which is believed to have a deterrent effect on populations, aside from 
punishing individuals for committed crimes17.  
The International Criminal Court has been the subject of criticism, namely 
regarding demonstrated operational and political problems, as well as limitations with 
institutional legitimacy18. We will not, however, exhaust this topic. The Statute of the 
ICC is a treaty, adopted at the Rome Conference in 1998 and entered into force in 2002. 
The Court’s jurisdiction has, therefore, a voluntary nature. The Court can exercise 
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and the crime of 
aggression (Article 5).  
From the Preamble of the Statute and from Article 1 and Article 17 emanates a rule 
of complementarity as to the admissibility of cases19. The preamble and Article 1 provide 
that the “International Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions”. This means that State cooperation is vital to the effective 
functioning of the Court20. However, the Statute of the Court does not apply to a 
significant number of States (The United States, China, Russia and India, for example, 
are not parties to the Rome Statute, leaving a big part of world population outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court). Moreover, the ICC mechanisms to enforce the duty to cooperate 
 
14Ramsbotham et. al, 2005, p. 141 ff. 
15
 Monteiro, 2000. 
16
 Strauss, 2015. 
17
 Lund, 2009.  
18
 Orakhelashvili, 2019, p. 449. See Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 95 ff. 
19
 Orakhelashvili, 2019, p. 445 
20
 Sluier, 2009. Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 92. 
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are seemingly flawed21. Finally, the Court is criticised for its “selectivity”, both in the 
definition of so-called “international crimes” and in the range of situations where its 
jurisdiction is exercised.22 Critical scholars point to the fact that the Court’s activities 
have been, so far, focused on Africa, which has led to some States, such as Burundi, 
withdrawing their ratifications of the Rome Statute.23.  
Returning to the matter of Conflict Prevention, in its turn, so-called a priori conflict 
prevention relates itself to the concept of positive peace. The latter is a much broader 
definition, in which the absence of high levels of violence is an element, encompassing 
nevertheless other features that can be applied in different contexts, such as human rights, 
justice and conflict management. Further components of positive peace would be state-
to-state relations, national societies, and group interactions. Building positive peace is, 
therefore, a long-term process and requires extensive and ongoing commitments by the 
International Community24.  
 
 
2. UN Legal and Institutional Framework for Conflict Prevention 
 
The next step of our analysis falls under the current legal and institutional 
framework for Conflict Prevention, within the United Nations system. Our legal 
assessment follows a chronological sequence. We start from the Charter of the United 
Nations, adopted in 1945 and its chapter VI, entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”. 
Then, we move onto the International Law Commission (ICL)’s Draft articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which date from 2001. 
Finally, we introduce the latest normative effort, namely Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 
which has its legal source in the adoption of the 2005 Word Summit Outcome Document 
(WSOD) by the General Assembly, and its subsequent endorsement by the Security 
Council (in, e.g.: Resolution 1674 (2006) on Protection of civilians in armed conflict).   
 
 
21
 See Sluiter, G., 2009. Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 92. 
22
 Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 90. 
23
 Orakhelashvili, 2019, p. 449. 
24
 Diehl, 2016. 
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a.   The Charter 
Article 2(3) and Article 33 of the UN Charter, the founding document of the 
organisation, establish a general obligation for States to settle legal or political disputes 
peacefully. Furthermore, they contain a general prohibition of the threat or use of force 
in international relations. In combination, these rules set a changing point in the 
international legal system, after the Second World War. 
Article 33 is relevant in respect of States Responsibility for wrongful acts. This 
article encompasses a general obligation for States to resort to peaceful methods of 
dispute settlement, such as mediation, negotiations or arbitration, when reparation – 
which, being the case, must in the first place have been requested – is not made or 
considered unsatisfactory25.  
Following Cassese’s26 explanation, there are two categories of State accountability. 
The first concerns the “private” relation between States bounded by contractual 
obligations due to bilateral or multilateral treaties. This is the responsibility for ordinary 
breaches of International Law and protects States’ interests of an economic, commercial 
or diplomatic nature. The second form of accountability is an aggravated responsibility 
for violations of general community rules, erga omnes obligations protecting fundamental 
rights – peace, Human Rights, the self-determination of peoples, or obligations erga 
omnes contractantes. In this case, a public relation arises between the infringing State and 
all the other States (in the case of treaty breaches, all the other contracting States). 
Consequently, even third States which are not affected by the illegal act of a violating 
State may be entitled to react if all States have a legal interest in the protection of specific 
rights27. 
 
b.   ICL’s Draft Articles on States Responsibility for Wrongful 
Acts 
In view of the importance of the concept of State Responsibility, the International 
Law Commission’s (ICL) Draft Articles on States Responsibility for Wrongful Acts, from 
 
25
 Cassese, 2001, p. 186. 
26
 Idem., p.182 ff. 
27
 Orakhelashvili, 2019, p. 293. 
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2001, in chapter III deal with “Serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms 
of general International Law”. This implies that the presented draft falls under the scope 
of the above-mentioned aggravated responsibility for violations of erga omnes 
obligations.  
From a Conflict Prevention point of view, the relevant articles are Article 41 and 
article 48. The former entails a positive duty for States to cooperate in ending serious 
breaches of International Law, whether they are individually affected by it or not. The 
latter authorizes non-injured States to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoer. As 
Wyler and Castellanos-Jankiewicz28 observe, States have the right to react against crimes 
in the name of every member of society. The ICL stated29 that this duty of cooperation 
must be pursued through lawful means and can be institutionalized - through the UN, for 
example - or non-institutionalized. Nevertheless, this cooperation can assume a variety of 
forms.  
 
c.   Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) is an international legal principle which creates 
legal and political obligations for States. Its legal foundations arise from the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document (WSOD), paragraphs 138 and 13930, several United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions (e.g.: Resolution 1674 (2006) on Protection of 
civilians in armed conflict) combined with International Jus Cogens norms, such has the 
Genocide Convention31.  
The doctrine essentially encompasses two different sets of responsibilities. The first 
one would be the responsibility of each State to protect its own population. This obligation 
follows from Ius Cogens norms. In the specific case of e.g. genocide prevention, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its judgment of the Srebrenica Case has explained 
that States have an international responsibility to take all measures available to them 
 
28
 Wyler, Castellanos-Jankiewicz, 2014.   
29
 ILC Report on the Work of its Sixty-First Session, GAOR 64th Sess., Suppl. No. 10, Doc. A/64/10 of 4 
May to 5 June and 6 July to 7 August 2009. 
30In: 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_
RES_60_1.pdf. 
31
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adopted by the general 
assembly of the united nations on 9 December 1948. 
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which might have “a deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing genocide, or 
reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent”, whether it be in their territory or in 
the territory of another State, within the limits of International Law. 32 
 The second set of responsibilities lies within the sphere of the principal category 
of international legal persons, States, acting through the United Nations, within the scope 
of its delegated powers. When a State manifestly fails to protect its population or itself 
commits genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, there should 
be an international effort to assist in the reestablishment of peace and security. These 
efforts should preferably be conducted through peaceful means, and as a last resort, the 
international community could resort to the measures of chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations.  
In view of the above it can be concluded that, territorial States have the primary 
responsibility to protect and assist their citizens and should they manifestly fail to do so, 
the International Community, namely through the UN, is bound to assist in the 
reestablishment of peace and security. This secondary responsibility is, however, limited 
to the imminence of or commission of any of the four categories of crimes listed in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)33.  
‘Responsibility to Protect’ is also commonly summarized in “three pillars”. The 
first one being the primary responsibility of each State towards its citizens; secondly the 
pledge to assist other States in fulfilling their responsibility; and the third one, as members 
of the International Community, readiness to act collectively in cases of “manifest” failure 
of a State in protecting its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or 
crimes against humanity34.  
One final consideration about the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is that its 
current formulation is consistent with the model of “sovereignty as responsibility”, as 
developed by Francis Deng. In Deng’s view35, sovereignty is a two-dimensional concept. 
It encompasses the above-mentioned responsibility for the welfare of each State’s 
population and entails an implicit assumption of accountability. The International 
 
32
 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
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Community renders complementary protection and assistance to those in need and holds 
Governments accountable of the discharge of their national responsibility towards their 
population. As Francis Deng further explains, international normative parameters of 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law compel the international community to react to 
humanitarian crises. The only way to balance this idea with the concept of sovereignty is 
by establishing minimum standards of responsibility, having the international community 
take a complementary role in protecting populations.  
Below, we will return to the concept of sovereignty. We will address some 
questions which arose in scholarly debates concerning the acceptance of Francis Deng’s 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’ concept.  
 
d.  Institutional Framework 
Turning our attention to the current institutional UN framework, in 2008 the 
Secretary-General appointed the first Special Adviser for the Responsibility to Protect 
and later in 2011, a joint office with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 
was established, the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. The 
two Special Advisers report directly to the Secretary-General and share a common 
methodology for early warning, assessment, convening, learning, and advocacy in order 
to protect populations from the four categories of atrocity crimes, as well as their 
incitement. They have a preventive focused mandate to act as catalysts in raising 
awareness of the causes and dynamics of atrocity crimes, having none of the Special 
Advisers judicial or quasi-judicial powers36.   
Ekkehard Strauss37 points to the fact, that despite the Office’s needed and 
pertinent mandate to fulfil a gap within the UN institutional structure for early warning 
and early action towards mass atrocities, the reality is that in practice it falls short on 
achieving its objective. One of the reasons emphasised by Strauss is the lack of 
consistency of the concept of Responsibility to Protect, since the content of this concept 
is still being discussed. In order to correctly implement Responsibility to Protect it is 
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necessary that the member states of the United Nations agree on its legal, operational, and 
methodological framework. 
 
e. The Secretary-General pledges 
António Gueterres has consistently pledged for a switch of the International 
Community response paradigm to a preventive one. In his 2017 Report entitled 
“Implementing the responsibility to protect: accountability for prevention”38,  highlighted 
in paragraph 13 are the legal obligations of States to address the root causes of atrocity 
crimes, which entail the “creation of State structures and institutions that are functioning 
and legitimate, respect human rights and the rule of law, deliver services equitably and 
can address or defuse sources of tension before they escalate”.  
In his 2018 Report “Responsibility to protect: from early warning to early 
action”39, he refers to the need to strengthen international cooperation and multilateral 
institutions to respond to conflicts, namely through mechanisms of early warning and 
early action. Moreover, he stresses that inclusive and sustainable development are the 
best form of prevention against all kinds of humanitarian risks, including the risk of 
atrocity crimes. The Secretary-General further states that the most effective preventive 
approaches are inclusive, integrated, adaptive, flexible and sustained, and require the 
active participation of civil society, the business sector, religious and traditional leaders 
and individuals. Emphasis is given to ending gender-based discrimination and 
empowering the role of women as agents of atrocity prevention.  
 
f.   A normative gap? 
As much as a normative development of the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
is needed, so it appears that legal scholars and practitioners have mainly focused their 
attention on the reaction to mass atrocities under Responsibility to Protect. We have asked 
ourselves whether there is a legal gap for conflict prevention or if the current legal norms 
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need to be further developed, in order to reach contexts outside the committing of mass 
atrocities.  
In view of the above, we suggest that the duty of cooperation established under the 
Draft Articles and its assumed open format, in combination with the first two pillars of 
Responsibility to Protect may be key in legitimizing the referred normative development.  
As Hitoshi Nasu40 observes, the International Community’s responsibility under 
pillars II and III of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine is different in nature from the 
State’s responsibility towards its population. Article 1(3) of the Charter of the United 
Nations provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is “to achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural or humanitarian character (…)”. However, the system of the United Nations lacks 
law enforcement mechanisms that would enable assuming a positive obligation to ensure 
the protection of Human Rights and respect for Humanitarian Law41.   
Following Nasu’s explanation, the positive duty of cooperation established under 
Article 40 and Article 41 of the ICL’s Articles on State Responsibility could provide the 
legal basis for the International Community’s responsibility to protect. Quoting the ILC’s 
commentary, “such cooperation, especially in the framework of international 
organizations, is carried out already in response to the gravest breaches of international 
law.”42 
The term “Responsibility” in the concept of Responsibility to Protect is limited to 
the occurrence or imminence of mass atrocity crimes, directing its scope away from a 
preventive context where mass atrocity is nowhere to be seen, thus making it difficult to 
invoke its rhetoric in such a situation. As a result, we denote that the current legal 
definition of the principle results in a contradiction with its enunciation, regarding 
preventive action in a context far from the occurrence of mass atrocities.  
Moreover, Francis Deng’s above mentioned “sovereignty as responsibility” norm, 
besides opening the doors for legitimate reaction from third States, is especially relevant 
for prevention concerns. Jentleson43 defends the need to strengthen this norm in order to 
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legitimize early action to prevent deadly conflicts, arguing its coherence with articles 2 
(7) and chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The author also emphasises that 
the Charter of the United Nations protects the “sovereignty of the peoples”, in Kofi 
Annan’s words and accordingly, allows an intervention in the name of Human Rights and 
the protection of human dignity, as well as in compliance with the Security Council’s 
mandate of maintaining international peace and security. Thus, it can prevail over national 
territorial sovereignty. Nolte44 explains that the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, 
besides being relevant in case of military intervention, is important in the context of 
terrorism, human rights, and other areas. Conceiving sovereignty not only as a set of 
rights, but also with obligations, makes the point that States are effectively obligated to 
control their territory, to respect human rights, and, to a certain degree, to exercise good 
governance45. The normative framework, however, remains weaker in what concerns 
preventive action.  
 
3. The Use of Force to prevent conflict escalation 
The general prohibition of the use of force in international relations is a principle 
of International Law. The prohibition results from the obligation to respect the territorial 
integrity and political independence of States46. The framework of this principle emanates 
from Article 2(4), Article 42 and Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. This 
rule is also a rule of international consuetudinary law47 and the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) recognized it as a Jus Cogens rule in the case Nicaragua vs. United States48. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that “All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
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the Purposes of the United Nations”.49. Article 4250 and Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations encompass two exceptions to the prohibitive principle.  
The norm of the Article 51 is considered the main exception to the principle51. It 
recognizes the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations (…)”. This means that the right of self-
defence exists when a State suffers a previous armed attack52. Additionally, the ICJ 
recognized the consuetudinary nature of this right in the Nicaragua case53. Furthermore, 
the Court stated that not all aspects of this right are directly regulated by the Charter of 
the United Nations. Nevertheless, the right of self-defence is limited by the legal 
parameters of the Charter54.  
As Maria Isabel Tavares55 observes, the principle prohibiting the use of force is 
related to the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes. Tavares explains that if 
States shall refrain from the use of force in their international relations, then, naturally, 
alternative options must be conceived. This interpretation is reinforced by an examination 
of other provisions of the Charter56. Article 2(3) provides that “All Members shall settle 
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace 
and security, and justice, are not endangered. Finally, this view was also supported in the 
Corfu Channel case57. 
The doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention professes the intention to protect 
citizens from the oppression of their own Government, typically consisting of invasion 
and bombardment of State territory.58 However, this is not permitted by the Charter of the 
United Nations59. Moreover, under Article 3 and Article 5 of the General Assembly 
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Resolution 3314 (1974)60, humanitarian intervention is a crime of aggression. Article 3 
provides that invasion and bombardment of State territory are example of aggression. 
Article 5 states that “no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, 
military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.” 
Finally, in the aftermaths of 1999 NATO’s intervention in Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia, 132 States adopted the Havana Declaration61, in 2000, stating that “We reject 
the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the UN 
Charter or in the general principles of international law”62. 
Under Responsibility to Protect principle, when national authorities are unable or 
unwilling to protect their citizens, the duty shifts to the international community. When 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods of protecting populations at risk are 
insufficient, it may be necessary for the Security Council to act under chapter VII of the 
Charter. It must be borne in mind that those would be situations of the utmost 
exceptionality.  
One of the strongest criticisms towards Responsibility to Protect concerns the 
possible political derogation of the prohibition of use of force. In fact, this aspect has 
received the greatest attention by scholars and politicians, who cautiously doubt 
Responsibility to Protect rhetoric.  
Understanding of this criticism takes us back to the fact that the concept of 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ was first announced by the International Commission on State 
Intervention and Sovereignty (ICCS), in its 2001 Report entitled “Responsibility to 
Protect”. The ICCS emerged in 2000, in response to Kofi Annan’s pledge for consensus 
regarding the parameters for authorization of external military intervention for human 
protection purposes. At the time, pursuing the event of the NATO’s lead intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999, the topic of humanitarian intervention was highly controversial. Some 
authors63 point to the fact that the report left several aspects unclear, such as the meaning 
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of the term “International Community”, since, as critical scholars pointed out, it remained 
unclear whether an authorization by the Security Council was always necessary64.  
However, with the adoption of the principle in 2005 by the General Assembly, it 
became very clear that military intervention, being a last resort mechanism, could only 
occur with authorization of the Security Council. 65.  Following this fact, we assert the 
idea that a historical and systematic interpretation of this norm within the United Nations 
legal framework is consistent with the organization’s goal of maintaining international 
peace and security66. Being, therefore, inconsistent with a doctrine of unilateral 
intervention for humanitarian purposes.  
In view of the above, it can be concluded that military intervention, within the 
scope of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is legitimized through a collective decision-making 
process, resulting in the adoption of a Security Council resolution. The doctrine of 
Humanitarian Intervention, which professes a right of unilateral military intervention, is 
incompatible with the principles of International Law. Distinguishing these two doctrines 
is of paramount importance when it comes to developing a legal framework for conflict 
prevention. 
Furthermore, in his report In larger freedom from 2005, Kofi Annan emphasised 
the need for the Security Council to set the guiding principles for the authorization of the 
use of force. The former Secretary-General recommended that the Council, when 
considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, arrive at a common 
view on (i) how to weight the seriousness of the threat; (ii) the proper purpose of the 
proposed military action; (iii) whether means short of the use of force might plausibly 
succeed in stopping the threat; (iv) whether the military option is proportional to the threat 
at hand; and (v) whether there is a reasonable chance of success67. 
In this report, Kofi Annan also made important considerations regarding the 
concept of sovereignty. The former Secretary-General stated that “no legal principle – not 
even the sovereignty – should ever be allowed to shield genocide, crimes against 
humanity and mass human suffering”68. Referring to the ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ 
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norm, emphasis was given to the “collective”69 aspect of it. As Georg Nolte70 notes, 
caution is required in translating Responsibility to Protect into a legal norm. There is a 
risk that established legal procedures are overcome by powerful States, such as happened 
in Kosovo 1999. We will develop this topic in the following section.   
 
a. Sovereignty as Responsibility 
Sovereignty71 is a plastic concept which has been readapted over time, namely since 
the Westphalian paradigm72 up to contemporary concepts such as Deng’s “sovereignty as 
responsibility”. As George Nolte notes, “the concept of sovereignty invites projections 
by its interpreters of their respective Weltanschauung, their world vision.”73  
Nolte further explains that in the past, sovereignty was described as an absolute 
power and intrinsically related to the right to go to war, being the basis for the rule of law 
in interstate relations and the prohibition on going to war, whereas nowadays the concept 
of sovereignty is discussed in its relationship with globalization.  
Georg Nolte points to two functions of the concept of sovereignty: “(i) sovereignty 
must leave enough room for the requirements of globalization; (ii) sovereignty must 
protect against undue interference by equals.”74 In legal terms, the liberty of states can be 
restricted in the general interest, however, their status as equals should be preserved75.  
Conceiving the concept of sovereignty as implicitly encompassing a set of 
responsibilities is not a new idea. Max Huber, in the Island of Palmas arbitration case 
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(1928) said that “Territorial sovereignty (…) has as its corollary a duty: the obligation to 
protect within the territory the rights of other states (…)”76 
However, it should be noted that it can prove dangerous, and it did in the past, to 
make use of Responsibility to Protect rhetoric only to overcome the barrier of a more 
restrictive concept of sovereignty. In 1999 the Kosovo war represented a case where a 
military appraisal was engaged against an alleged infringing State, without Security 
Council’s authorization. Additionally, when the Security Council addressed the case in 
resolution 1244, from 10 June 1999, it remained silent as to the question of legitimacy for 
the use of force. As Azeredo Lopes77 remarked, this could represent a precedent for 
legitimizing the doctrine of unilateral military intervention. However, following Azeredo 
Lopes’ opinion, such argument cannot proceed.  
Azeredo Lopes78 further explains that the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo was 
conducted outside the limits of International Law. NATO’s declarations often invoked 
moral justifications for the use of force based on humanitarian urgency and necessity due 
to the risks suffered by Kosovans. Moreover, this behaviour can be understood through 
the fact that prior to Kosovo’s intervention, the United States and United Kingdom had 
tried to justify the use of force against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (based on 
Security Council’s resolutions 1199 and 1201). Having failed to obtain Security Council’s 
authorization, the referred States opted to act outside the scope of the Council’s authority.   
 
4. Lessons 
 As we have pointed out above, Conflict Prevention is normatively poorly 
delimited. Taking the view that in order to fulfil this gap, cooperation between 
International Law and International Relations scholars and practitioners is necessary79, 
one way to foster a prosperous dialogue would be bringing the two scientific fields 
together.  
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Law and Politics are intrinsically related, since politicians are law-makers. 
Moreover, international rules are materialized in international relations, the two fields 
being constantly in symbiosis. Responsibility to Protect as it is today, theoretically 
conceptualized by the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, emerged from political 
will and has ever since gained a more secure legal foundation – the United Nations (and, 
specifically, the Security Council) being the primary stakeholder pushing for its 
development.     
However, on the one hand, we currently observe a fragmentation of world politics. 
It has continuously become clear that States are too cautious to commit to preventive 
binding rules. Under-developed States fear preventive rhetoric may only be a trojan horse 
for sovereignty breaches, while the rest of the world is held back by economic concerns.80 
Another factor is, as Michael Lund81 notes, the fact that successful cases of peaceful 
prevention of conflicts usually go unnoticed and, thus, there is a general unawareness, 
outside the professional circles, on how peace is maintained. This contributes to a certain 
degree of “pessimism”, in Lunds’s words, towards the value of Conflict Prevention 
efforts. 
On the other hand, there is a communicational gap between the fields of (Public) 
International Law and International Relations. Experts from both fields, as well as 
politicians and actors of international society theorize about the necessity of a change of 
the paradigm of the International Community’s action concerning massive violence and 
atrocity82. However, the two fields adopt contradicting standpoints regarding the concept 
of ‘Responsibility to Protect’. International Relations scholars are reluctant to 
conceptualize Responsibility to Protect as a legal principle83, whereas international 
lawyers assume its legal nature84. Dialogue becomes difficult when one reality is 
theorized in such different formats.    
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As a consequence, we underline an inadequate operation of Responsibility to 
Protect by the International Community’s actors, who have chosen to enhance only the 
reactive aspect of this doctrine, calling on it to “legally” justify the use of force – such as 
in the Libya Case85. Monica Naime86, analysing the Libya case, reflected on the context 
under which the Security Council Resolution No. 1973 was adopted and on the synergy 
between law-making and world politics/geopolitical interests. Five members – the 
“BRIC” (Brazil, Russia, India and China), together with Germany – abstained from the 
vote, some of them alleging the disproportion of the measures. Naime notes that they 
were all economic powers with special interests in Libya oil contracts. However, instead 
of exercising their veto right, these countries choose an abstention. Perhaps this state 
behaviour was merely a political decision in order to avoid a direct confrontation with 
Libya, and no opposition to the resolution text.   
On the other hand, as Graham Cronogue87 explains, the abstaining countries were 
also concerned that the authorization of force would be used as authority for a regime 
change. In fact, the decision not to exercise their veto right was made under the assurance 
that the use of force was limited to protecting civilians. However, NATO stepped beyond 
the scope of its stated rules of engagement and the Security Council authorization. As a 
consequence, both China and Russia felt that they had been misled by the United States 
and other Western powers. In the aftermaths of the intervention in Libya, Chinese and 
Russian officials vowed to never approve such kinds of intervention again88. 
From our perspective, there is an urgent need for a better understanding of the 
synergies between International Law and International Relations, as well as an overture 
from both sides to interchange and reciprocity. The Libya case illustrates how political 
games may undermine the chances of acceptance by States of legally binding parameters 
of conflict prevention.  
The use of force in preventing the escalation of conflicts is the most fragile aspect 
of Responsibility to Protect doctrine, and thus the most contested.  Nevertheless, we argue 
that the focus should be on peaceful methods which can be used as a replacement for 
bullets. In our point of view, speech about conflict prevention, and consequently, death 
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and mass atrocity prevention, should encompass peace-making discourse. Otherwise, we 
are talking about fighting fire with fire.  
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III. Mediation 
 
In this chapter we intend to provide a theoretical insight on Mediation. Firstly, we 
briefly introduce the topic of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms and the theory of 
so-called Conflict Transformation. Together these two concepts set the context for our 
analysis on the relevance of Mediation. Then, we introduce some doctrinal contributions 
for the understanding of the outcome of Mediation by explaining the role Mediators play 
in the process and how they affect conflict structures. Lastly, we present some concrete 
techniques which could be used in the course of Mediation, namely under Nonviolent 
Communication auspices.  
Our goal is to show how Mediation could also be a tool for conflict prevention. At 
the same time, we intend to provide ground for exchanges between several scientific 
fields and their respective approaches regarding this mechanism. Ultimately, we adopt 
the view that international actors should combine efforts to develop a common framework 
for an appropriate and timely enaction of Mediation. By doing this, we pave the way for 
a shifting paradigm, which we have been referring to above. 
 
1. Peaceful Dispute Settlement Mechanisms briefly 
Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations deals with the peaceful settlement 
of disputes and with the peaceful adjustment of situations which might give rise to a 
dispute89. According to Tomuschat90, a dispute arises when one States addresses another 
State with opposing claims. The term ‘situations’ refers to contexts of political tension 
between States from which further negative consequences may flow. Article 33, which 
should be interpreted in combination with Article 2(3) of the Charter91, provides that  
“1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
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2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their 
dispute by such means.” 
Article 33 (1) explicitly mentions the principle of free choice of means for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes92. Although States are obliged to settle their disputes by 
peaceful means, they may not be tied to a specific procedure93. Among traditional 
mechanisms for pursuing the prevention or peaceful settlement of disputes, two classes 
of means can be distinguished: the ones which aim at inducing the disputants to reach 
agreement and those which are designated to confer a third party the power to settle the 
dispute by a legally binding decision94. Examples of the first set of mechanisms are 
negotiation, inquiry or fact-finding, good offices, mediation and conciliation.  
Arbitration is an example of a traditional mechanism for settling disputes by a 
legally binding decision95, an option provided for in several treaties, plus endeavoured by 
the creation of permanent bodies, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), 
settled in 1899 by the First Hague Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes and situated in the Peace Palace, in the Hague96.  
States resort to international arbitration courts, which typically have a contractual 
jurisdiction, limited to a small number of States97. These are effective peaceful dispute 
settlement mechanisms, suited to resolving certain types of disagreements within the 
context of treaty law. One example could be the World Trade Organization dispute 
settlement system. This mechanism’s “qualitative step”, in Cassese’s words, concerns the 
judicial nature of the process and the fact that the courts’ findings are legally binding to 
the parts.  
In view of this it can be concluded that, Arbitration is particularly relevant in 
‘ordinary responsibility’ cases, and it undeniably represents a big achievement for Public 
International Law. Nevertheless, each of the above-mentioned peaceful settlement 
mechanisms suit different contexts of conflict. Disputing States shall exercise their free 
choice of means in order to elect the most appropriate method in each situation.  
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2. Conflict Transformation 
The shifting paradigm we have been referring to finds conceptualization in Conflict 
Transformation, as John Paul Lederach98 presented it. In his opinion, Peace is embedded 
in Justice and conflict is normal in human relations, acting as a motor of change. The 
definition proposed by the author is that Conflict Transformation  
“is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities 
for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct 
interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human 
relationships.99” 
In summary, and paraphrasing Lederach, this is a constructive paradigm with the 
focus on the creation of adaptive responses to human conflict through change processes 
which increase justice and reduce violence. The targets are our face-to-face interactions 
and the ways we structure our social, political, economic and cultural relationships. Peace 
is viewed as a continuously evolving and developing quality of relationships and non-
violent approaches are at the centre of Peace work. The process is thus based on constant 
dialogue structures.  
It is nonetheless important to emphasize that so-called Conflict Transformation 
approaches involve those conflict resolution solutions which are best suited to each 
conflict. By choosing this approach, it will be possible for the International Community 
to solve a crisis in a quick and definite way. The difference is that a strict conflict 
resolution approach would miss the chance to raise the appropriate questions which would 
include social/structural change.  
Boutros Boutros-Ghali referred in his report An Agenda for Peace from 1992 
explicitly to the Conflict Transformation theory. At that time, the report was ground 
breaking and served as a basis for restructuring the United Nations’ perspective towards 
the International Community’s approaches to conflicts after the Cold War100. Quoting its 
59th paragraph:  
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“There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United Nations has an 
obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transformation of 
deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new 
democratic institutions. The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field 
would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political 
peace. There is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of 
law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and security 
in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be 
promoted at all levels of international and national political communities (emphasis 
added).” 
The change of approach within the UN is still taking place and more recently, the 
Security Council expressed its intention to consider the role and responsibilities of UN 
within peacekeeping and peace-building mandates in supporting efforts aimed at 
addressing the “root causes of conflicts”101. 
 
3. Mediation 
Mediation is an ancient tool and effective method for preventing, managing and 
resolving conflict, as well as for peace building purposes in post-conflict environments. 
Its roots stem back to as far as ca. 2000 BC, from references in the Bible102, going up to 
209 BC, when an attempt at mediating the First Macedonian War between the Aetholian 
League and Macedonia was made103. Furthermore, it has been present in multilateral 
treaties since the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, to the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes104. 
In the United Nation’s 1992 Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
between States105, Mediation is defined as “a method of peaceful settlement of an 
international dispute where a third party intervenes to reconcile the claims of the 
contending parties and to advance his own proposals aimed at a mutually acceptable 
compromise solution”.  
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 Bercovitch, Rubin, 2003. 
103
 Greirg, Diehl, 2012. 
104
 United Nations, 1992. 
105
 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 37/10, annex. (United Nations, 1992). 
Página 36 de 55 
 
Jacob Bercovitch106, providing a more extensive analysis of the definition of 
Mediation, summarizes its characteristics in the following quotation: 
“(1) Mediation is an extension and continuation of the parties' own conflict management 
efforts. 
(2) Mediation involves the intervention of an individual, group or organization into a 
dispute between two or more actors. 
(3) Mediation is a non-coercive, non-violent and ultimately non-binding form of 
intervention. 
(4) Mediation turns an original bilateral dispute into triadic interaction of some kind. By 
increasing the number of actors from two to three, mediation effects considerable structural 
changes and creates new focal points for an agreement. 
(5) A mediator enters a dispute in order to affect, change, resolve, modify or influence it in 
some way. 
(6) Mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources and 
interests of their own or of the group or organization they represent. Mediators are often 
important actors with their own assumptions and agendas about the dispute in question. 
International mediators are both interested and concerned parties. 
(7) Mediation is a voluntary form of intervention. This means the parties retain their control 
over the outcome (if not always the process) of their dispute, as well as their freedom to 
accept or reject mediation or mediator's proposals. 
(8) Mediation operates on an ad hoc basis only.” 
 
From the information above, we would like to highlight three essential aspects of 
Mediation: firstly, Mediation involves restructuring a conflict by introducing a third 
party. Furthermore, Mediation is non-violent. Finally, Mediation is a voluntary process 
by nature. We will address these three main issues by elaborating on the role of the 
mediator.  
 
a. The Mediator 
Paul F. Diehl and J. Michael Greig107  point to the diversity of cases in which 
Mediation is applicable as a conflict management tool. The range goes from divorce 
settlement talks to labour management negotiations to peace efforts between warring 
States. Common to these processes is that a third party is introduced into the negotiation 
process.  
Since this third party is crucial to the Mediation process, it is necessary to elaborate 
on the role of this third party. In order to understand this role, it is necessary to 
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comprehend the voluntary nature of Mediation. In the first place, Mediation processes 
depend on the existence of an outsider entity willing to engage in the dispute. On a second 
level, both disputing parties must consent to the Mediation process. Furthermore, during 
negotiations, any suggestion made by the mediator aimed at the settlement of the dispute 
is submitted to acceptance by the contending parties. Especially in international 
mediation, it is necessary to acknowledge the underlying reasons for both the mediator 
and the parties to participate in the process108. 
In the following, we briefly explain four different roles mediators can play: (i) 
outsider-neutral, (iii) transformative mediator, (ii) insider-partial and (iv) international 
mediator.  
Wehr and Lederach109 introduced the insider-partial concept, relating it to the 
outsider-neutral and the international mediator. What differentiates these concepts is the 
degree of externality, neutrality and impartiality, as well as the authority of the mediator 
in the process.  
An outsider-neutral mediator is both external to the conflict and impartial. In this 
case, the third party is not related to either disputing parties and has no interest outside 
the settlement of the dispute. These qualities specify the choice of the mediator for a 
process. This kind of mediator suits inter-group or inter-personal conflict management.  
In transformative mediation110, mediators focus solely on the process of conflict 
transformation. Besides being neutral, impartial and external to the conflict, 
transformative mediators are not authoritative. Their role is to support the parties as they 
discuss issues between themselves, as well as supporting their “empowerment” and 
“recognition shifts”. Transformative mediators do not lead nor guide the discussion or 
intend to influence the outcome.  
In its turn, an insider-partial is “the mediator from within the conflict”. His/her 
success relies on connectedness and trusted relationships with the conflicting parties111. 
In trust-based mediation, thus, the relationship between mediators and disputants 
continues after the settlement of the conflict.  
In complex international and intercultural disputes, the mediator needs to take on a 
variety of roles. For this reason, the concept of an international mediator remains open. 
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However, as Wehr and Lederach explain, neutrality and impartiality are usually not 
requisites for successful international mediation, whereas externality is perceived as 
important.   
 
b. Readiness to Negotiate Theory 
In order to understand how mediators change and restructure conflict dynamics, 
we will briefly discuss Dean G. Pruitt’s Readiness to Negotiate Theory112. 
Prior to the concept of readiness to negotiate is the concept of conflict escalation 
– the shifting of one or both parties to more extreme tactics. According to Pruitt, blame 
and distrust as well as dehumanization of the other party are both products and sources of 
conflict escalation113.  
Readiness for conflict resolution is a variable which pertains to a single party, 
rather than the situation between the two parties. Thus, a party’s readiness is in direct 
proportionality to the likelihood of entering and staying in negotiation, or mediation, 
putting human resources into the negotiation, making concessions, and taking risks – in 
order to achieve a peaceful outcome.  
As Pruitt further explains, two states of mind contribute to readiness: motivation 
to escape the conflict and optimism114. The former derives from the circumstances the 
parties are in and their conviction about the conflict’s dysfunctionality and counter 
productiveness. Optimism, on the other hand, if it develops at all, derives largely from 
events that occur after both sides have become motivated to escape and move beyond the 
conflict. It means that the parties have a sense that it is possible to move towards a 
mutually acceptable agreement. Consequently, for optimism to be maintained, a party 
must perceive the outlines of a possible agreement.  
This is where third parties, acting as intermediaries, make the difference. They 
can encourage optimism from both parties, by stimulating a “courtship dance”, a circular 
reassurance process. In addition to this, by entering the dispute, third parties become 
affected by this state of mind. As a consequence of this, the greater the chances of settling 
the dispute, the harder they will work. Third parties, inter alia, enable communication 
chains between the two sides, which lead to the increase of optimism and its components.  
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4. Mediation Techniques: Nonviolent Communication 
 
In this part of our analysis we will focus on the process of Mediation and providing 
an example of concrete techniques. During this analysis we will point out the underlying 
theoretical conceptualization – which may be used by mediators to enable communication 
between the disputing parties.  
As a starting point, reference is made to the UNESCO Constitution’s preamble115, 
where it is stated: “(…) since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men 
that the defences of peace must be constructed”. 
From this quote it follows that Mediation encompasses parts of Psychology. 
Nonviolent Communication (NVC) 116 was developed by Dr. Marshall B. Rosenberg 
(1934-2015), and it is sometimes called “compassionate communication” or “the 
language of life”. Nonviolent Communication techniques enable self-expression in a way 
that supports empathy for both oneself and for others. Moreover, it is credited with 
allowing an overcoming of religious, cultural and language constraints117.  
In Speak Peace in a World of Conflict: What You Say Next Will Change Your 
World118, Rosenberg expresses his belief that at the core of violence is the mindset which 
pertains that reward and punishment are deserved. As individuals, as groups and as a 
society, we have become accustomed to thinking and judging each other in ways that 
imply that reward is justified, and punishment is justified. Illustrating, Rosenberg refers 
to retributive principles which inform judicial systems and reinforce the referred idea119. 
Further, the author of the book affirms that Nonviolent Communication implies 
awareness regarding blame and judgement. When we worry about how we are going to 
be judged by other people, we lose consciousness regarding our own needs. Finally, under 
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this mindset, we develop language that disconnects us from ourselves and other people, 
making compassion very difficult. 
Related to this, as source of conflict, are enemy images – the thinking that there is 
something wrong with individuals, or groups “which act in ways we don’t like” (gangs, 
in Rosenberg’s terminology120). In view of this, it is often difficult to recognize that those 
who are doing these things are human beings like us. Rosenberg explains that in 
Mediation processes, whether the parties are two individuals, two groups, or two 
countries, he commonly found that people don’t know how to properly express their needs 
and requests121. Instead, they begin the discussion with enemy images, i.e., pointing out 
what is wrong with the other person/group/country.  
In this book, Marshall Rosenberg describes how he mediated a conflict between 
two warring tribes in northern Nigeria. When he arrived, violence was intense and one 
hundred of the four hundred people in the community had been killed that year. The 
conflict was about how many stands each tribe would get in the marketplace. Rosenberg 
explains that the first thing he usually said in a Mediation process was “I’m confident that 
if anybody’s needs get expressed and understood, we’ll find a way to get everybody’s 
needs met. So, who would like to begin, please? I’d like to hear what needs of yours are 
not being met.” From here, parties usually express criticisms, judgments and enemy 
images. By resorting to Nonviolent Communication, the mediator translates these images 
into needs. One of the tribe’s chief had answered the first question by saying “You’re 
murderers”. Rosenberg reformulated this statement, asking “Chief, are you expressing a 
need for safety that isn’t being met? You have a need for safety. You would hope that no 
matter what’s going on, things could be resolved with nonviolence, correct?”. After 
understanding the needs behind judgments, such as demonstrated, the mediator ensures 
that the other party hears those needs. So, he asks the other party to repeat what needs 
were expressed. In this case, Rosenberg had to repeat the message two or more times until 
the other party was able to tell him what had been said. The process develops following 
this pattern. The mediator asks questions, reformulates answers and asks the parties to 
repeat what is being said, in order to enable communication. As Rosenberg states, 
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conflicts can be resolved peacefully if we can express our needs without putting it in an 
enemy image122.  
 
 
5. Challenges 
Grieg and Diehl123 discuss the challenge of distinguishing between Mediation 
success and failure. As these authors explain, it is not unusual for a Mediation effort to 
produce a cease-fire without achieving a permanent conflict settlement. For example, 
during the war in the former Yugoslavia, forty-six separate mediated cease-fires were 
subscribed. However, even when perceived as a failure, Mediation efforts may contribute 
to peace in the long run, as well as helping build trusting relations between the disputants, 
by bringing the two sides to conversation124. Context conditions, such as the severity of 
the conflict and issues over which it is fought, tell more about success and failure than 
statistical rates regarding the achievement of a full settlement. 
Afolabi and Idowu125 conducted an assessment of negotiation and mediation 
performed in the Mano River Basin126. These authors refer to the high level of migration, 
internally displaced persons and refugees in the region, relating them to the failure of 
negotiation and mediation processes. A lack of effective supervision and management of 
internally displaced persons and refugees is linked to a multiplication of violence and 
conflicts. Despite the significant drop denoted, the level of violence and conflicts has 
remained intermittent. For this reason, Afolabi and Idowu question the effectiveness and 
viability of negotiation and mediation. Among other factors, the authors point to the lack 
of financial funding as a limitation of negotiations and mediation processes, as well as 
the disregard for indigenous structures and institutions. Emphasis is also given to a lack 
of neutrality of the mediators. Nevertheless, the authors recognize the usefulness of 
negotiation and mediation techniques in the pursuit of sustainable peace in the Mano 
River Basin.  
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In view of this, it can be stated that a theoretical discourse about Conflict Prevention 
through Mediation involves constant reality checking. It is important to comprehend that 
contexts within violence-torn societies are extremely fractured and thus relations are very 
fragile127. Issues brought to negotiation tables are, consequently, of utmost sensitivity. 
Additionally, it is required to conceptualize an assistance framework that can enable 
setting the proper conditions for negotiations or mediation, as well as other activities 
aimed at creating peace, to take place. All of this depends on the existence of both political 
will, and availability of financial resources. Moreover, it only is achievable through 
cooperation between various civil society and international actors. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: VENEZUELA 
 
So far, we have addressed the thematic of Conflict Prevention from a purely 
theoretical point of view. In the present chapter, we aim at complementing our assessment 
by analysing the current Venezuelan crisis. The aim of this chapter is to provide insight 
on theory that can be applied to reality. 
Venezuela’s case was elected for its contemporaneity, not least because it illustrates 
several concepts presented throughout our dissertation, as well as mirroring some of the 
concerns expressed. The analysis is based on information retrieved from news sources 
(journals, newspapers), United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, and 
reports from United Nations agencies, namely, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as related NGOs. 
Our commentaries are based on the theories and discussions presented in the preceding 
chapters.   
 
1. Overview  
In May 2018, Nicolás Maduro was elected President of the Republic for the second 
time. The election was controversial and boycotted by most opposition parties. Under 
allegation that the election was not fair, the National Assembly, controlled by opposition, 
did not recognise Maduro’s re-election. On 23rd January 2019, Juan Guaidó, president of 
the National Assembly, declared himself acting president, under the scope of Article 233 
and Article 333 of Venezuela’s Constitution128.  
Venezuela’s political crisis has had an economic, social and humanitarian impact. 
Around a quarter of the country’s population (an estimated seven million people) are 
currently in need of urgent humanitarian assistance129. In addition, it is estimated that over 
4.3 million Venezuelans have fled the country130, a situation referred to as unparalleled 
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in Latin America’s modern history131. In their daily lives, hyperinflation is perhaps the 
biggest problem faced by Venezuelans. According to the International Monetary Fund132, 
Venezuela inflation rate arrived at 10 million% in April 2019. 
On 27th September 2019, an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was established by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, through resolution 42/25133, for a period of one year, to assess alleged human 
rights violations since 2014.  
 
2. Security Council division 
The Security Council debated the situation in Venezuela for the fourth time on 10th 
of April 2019134. The geopolitical division is visible through statements made by the 
different States’ representatives. Michael R. Pence, Vice-President of the United States 
(US), declared support to Juan Guaidó as the legitimate President of Venezuela, 
describing Maduro’s regime as a threat to peace and stability in the wider region. Pence 
urged Member States to support the text of a resolution being drafted by the United States 
recognizing the legitimacy of the interim President. Furthermore, he stated that although 
the US will continue to exert pressure for the restoration of peace and democracy, “all 
options are on the table”. 
Vassily A. Nebenzia, representing the Russian Federation, contested the United 
States’ declarations and referred to Maduro’s Government as the legitimate Government, 
further alleging that Venezuelans have the right to determine their own future. 
Additionally, Nebenzia established a parallel between the situation in Venezuela and the 
crises in Syria, Iraq and Libya, which, under his view, resulted from Western 
interventions.  
In its turn, Venezuela’s representative Samuel Moncada referred to United States’ 
statements as a threat of war. Moncada revealed concerns regarding a “plan by the United 
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States and United Kingdom to wreak economic destruction by provoking a social 
implosion that could be used as a pretext for military intervention under the guise of the 
responsibility to protect”135. Samuel Moncada further recognized that the Government is 
killing its own people136. However, he accused the United States and United Kingdom of 
worsening the situation with the application of economic sanctions without the Council’s 
consent. 
 
3. Norway Mediation 
In May, representatives from both Venezuelan “presidents” met in Oslo, upon 
agreement, to initiate a dialogue process mediated by the State of Norway. Further 
negotiations took place in the Caribbean Island of Barbados. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Norway made several announcements from May 2019 to August 2019. 
According to these, parties were in search of a constitutional solution for the country 
aiming at the well-being of Venezuelans. The solutions to be found should include 
political, economic and electoral matters137.  
At the time of writing, however, the mediation process was suspended. In a public 
statement, Maduro announced that the dialogue had been interrupted, following the 
economic sanctions imposed by the Government of the United States, which, as he stated, 
Guaidó’s administration supports138.  
For a Mediation process to succeed, both parties need to maintain their optimism 
regarding the achievement of a solution agreed upon (in “Readiness to Negotiate” 
terminology). Although little is known about the Mediation process, which by nature is 
secret, the parties had in public statements shown resistance to make concessions. For 
example, on 6th September 2019, Nicolás Maduro declared that he would remove himself 
from the negotiations’ table if Juan Guaidó didn’t change his position regarding Guayana 
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Esquiba139. Such a statement, of course, undermines the chances of achieving success in 
a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Nevertheless, the Government of Norway reaffirmed 
its availability to further conduct the Mediation process. Dag Halvor Nylander140, who 
had been facilitating the process, published on his Twitter account, on 15th September 
2019 the following statement: 
“Norway is facilitating the negotiation process in Venezuela at the request of the principal 
political actors in the country, and reiterates its readiness to continue in this role as long as 
the parties consider it useful, and advance in the search of a negotiated solution.” 
Also against the chances of success are the visible enemy images which the parties 
publicly have been demonstrating. For example, Vice-President of Venezuela, Delcy 
Rodriguez Gomez, addressing UN General Assembly on 27th September 2019, referred 
to Juan Guaidó’s self-declaration as interim president as a “coup d’état”.141 In turn, Juan 
Guaidó refers to Maduro’s led Government as an “usurpation”142. As we saw earlier, in 
the chapter on Readiness theory, blame and distrust are sources of conflict escalation. 
Referring to the teachings of Marshall Rosenberg143, these enemy images can be worked 
throughout mediated conversations. For a lasting agreement to be celebrated, parties need 
to engage in a non-violent dialogue and overcome these barriers to communication.  
As to the role of the mediator, Norway is an outsider-neutral party. In a speech at 
the UN General Assembly on 27th September 2019144, Norway’s Prime Minister Erna 
Solberg stated that since the end of the Cold War, mediation and conflict resolution have 
been cornerstones of the State’s foreign policy. Solberg added that at the request of the 
parties, Norway has been engaged in resolving conflicts in Colombia, Venezuela, the 
Philippines, Afghanistan, in Africa, and in the Middle East.  
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 We believe that, the statement of Norway could pave the way for an international 
norm of customary law145. As e.g. the ICJ stated in the Nicaragua Case, custom embodies 
consent tacitly given through practice, repetition of conduct, and legal conviction as to 
the legal nature of the underlying rule146. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the 
constitutional requirements of the existence of custom, under article 38 of its Statute, of 
generality of State practice and its acceptance as law147. As Orakhelashvili observes, State 
practise can be gathered, among others, from statements made by government spokespersons to 
Parliament, to the press, at international conferences and at meetings of international 
organisations148. Moreover, the author explains that the amount of practice required to create a 
customary rule is relatively small, if there is no practice which goes against the alleged rule of 
customary law, and if such practise is well-known, carries out either the intention to create or 
maintain the relevant rule, and meets no significant opposition from other States149. 
 
4. Considerations 
In view of the above, and applying theories from the previous chapters, the 
following considerations can be made.  
In the first place, Mediation by the Government of Norway fulfils the duty of 
cooperation established under the ICL’s Draft Articles. As the ICL stated in commentary 
to the Draft Articles, the duty of cooperation can be non-institutionalized. In addition, 
international assistance is being provided by States hosting the four million Venezuelan 
refugees and migrants. Mostly, people have been fleeing to the neighbouring countries 
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile and Brazil150.  
Secondly, the contentious case illustrates the principle of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’, since Norway is assisting Venezuela to solve its internal political crisis. 
As we have explained above, international standards of Human Rights compel the 
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International Community to react in rupturing cases, such as is the case of Venezuela. In 
the Security Council’s meeting, Samuel Moncada, admitted that the country is itself 
perpetrating the killing of its own people. Besides, the State hasn’t been able to provide 
a safe environment for the population, and neither has it assured basic humanitarian 
standards of living. If the State of Venezuela is not able to fulfil its responsibilities 
towards its inhabitants, under the principle of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ the country 
is not in charge of its sovereignty. Additionally, the internal conflict has already spilt over 
to neighbouring countries, given the high outflow of migration and related tensions at the 
countries’ borders.   
In view of the above, we consider that the current reality in Venezuela exemplifies 
a context which could be covered by Responsibility to Protect framework. The prevention 
of mass atrocities begins long before they can possibly take place. However, the United 
Nations has not yet invoked the principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’. Nevertheless, 
Secretary-General António Gueterres demonstrated support for Norway’s facilitation 
initiative151.  
Above, we noted that ‘Responsibility to Protect’ scope of application is limited to 
the committing of mass atrocity crimes. Thus, invoking this principle implies admitting 
that such crimes are being committed. Moreover, the demonstrated division among the 
Members of the Security Council concerning the situation in Venezuela, as well as Russia 
and China’s concerns regarding past misuse of Responsibility to Protect doctrine, can be 
an impediment to a collective reaction under the Council.   
Regrettably, the United Nations system doesn’t foresee a concise normative 
response for cases such as is currently happening in Venezuela. In situations like this, 
taking into consideration the welfare of human beings, the complementary responsibility 
of the international community must be enacted. Mediation by the Government of 
Norway – who, in principle, is an outsider-neutral entity in the process, is representative 
of the shifting responsibility from territorial States to the International Community – and 
perhaps an attempt at shaping international customary law.  
We consider the case of Venezuela an illustration of a timely enaction of conflict 
prevention measures. Despite the ongoing Fact-Finding Mission established by the 
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United Nations Human Rights Council, concerning the possible violation of human rights 
in the country and without underestimating the severity of the situation lived by the 
Venezuelan people, the conflict hasn’t yet escalated into a civil war. It is still possible to 
prevent the eruption of an armed conflict in Venezuela.  
Finally, after suspending the mediation process with the opposition, Maduro 
confirmed that negotiations between the Government of Venezuela and the Government 
of the United States have been taking place for months152. The United States have not 
recognized the Government of Maduro as legitimate. However, the reality is that Maduro 
has de facto power over the territory, since the military are in support of the Government. 
Thus, the United States have imposed economic sanctions upon Venezuela153 in order to 
exert pressure on the Government of Maduro, so that the opposing leader Juan Guaidó 
can assume control of the Government and call new elections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
152
 Source: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-49421110. 
153
 Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/06/its-not-us-embargo-new-venezuela-
sanctions-are-all-about-citgo/. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Globalization has had an impact on the concept of territorial sovereignty, which is 
no longer perceived as an absolute power held by States. The elevation of the individual 
as a subject of innate and inalienable human rights and fundamental freedoms has become 
a corollary of the respective duty shared between each State and the International 
Community to protect these standards. Thus, nowadays, the concept of sovereignty 
encompasses a set of responsibilities held by States towards their populations.  
The idea of so-called ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ had been articulated in the 
1928 arbitration case Island of Palmas. More recently, since the beginning of the century, 
scholars such as Francis Deng have brought to debate the development of normative 
parameters to enforce the responsibility of States to protect their citizens from mass 
atrocities. Under the proposed framework, the International Community plays a 
complementary role in the protection of populations and shall provide assistance or take 
collective action when a State is manifestly failing or unwilling to do so.  
International Law imposes on States a general duty to ensure respect for Human 
Rights within their territory or jurisdiction. Moreover, specifically under the Genocide 
Convention, they are required to exercise due diligence in preventing genocide. On the 
other hand, the responsibility of the International Community to act proactively is 
different in nature. The ICL’s Articles on State Responsibility (namely its Articles 40, 41 
and 48) provide a positive duty of cooperation to end a serious breach, by a State, of an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of International Law. However, as observed 
in the ILC’s commentary, the question whether general International Law proscribes such 
duty remains open.   
The Preamble and Purposes of the United Nations are consistent with the existence 
of the duty of cooperation. Nevertheless, the organization lacks mechanisms of 
enforcement which would enable compliance with Human Rights Law and Humanitarian 
Law. The creation of such a legal framework is dependent on States’ political will, which, 
among other factors, has been the biggest challenge faced by scholars who defend the 
need to develop the normative parameters of so-called ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
principle. 
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The military intervention in Libya represented the first time the Security Council 
passed a resolution under ‘Responsibility to Protect’ scope. The members of the Council 
were divided, and concerns emerged regarding a possible attempt by The United States 
and other Western countries to interfere with the sovereignty of the State of Libya and 
force a change of regime. The Security Council’s authorization for the use of force was 
limited to the protection of civilians. However, NATO acted in breach of the agreed rules. 
In the aftermath of the Libya case, the adoption by the Security Council of such normative 
parameters became undermined, as China and Russia felt that they had been misled by 
the Western States.  
This geopolitical division of the Members of the Security Council is a constant 
challenge faced by the International Community in dealing with conflicts around the 
globe. More than ever, it is urgent to change the current reactive paradigm of dealing with 
the effects of mass atrocities in post-war tribunals. It is necessary to conceive of 
preventive procedures that could be enacted in a timely manner.  
The Venezuela case is already a sign of a change of paradigm. Although the 
Mediation process has not succeeded in ending the internal dispute, we believe it has 
opened the doors for the subsequent negotiating process which is taking place between 
the Maduro’s led Government (which has de facto power over the territory) and the 
Government of the United States.  
Moreover, Norway has publicly stated that Mediation and conflict resolution are 
cornerstones of the country’s foreign policy. From our point of view, this statement could 
pave the way for the development of a legal norm of customary law that would enable the 
enaction of Mediation in a timely manner in situations of internal conflicts.  
 Finally, putting on Conflict Transformation lenses, it must be emphasised that 
even if the International Community succeeds in preventing the outbreak of a war – and, 
therefore, achieving a state of negative peace – Venezuela still has a long way to go in 
the pursuit of positive peace. Conflict is an opportunity to raise the appropriate questions, 
which potentially allows restructuring and reforming national institutions. Furthermore, 
root causes of conflict must be addressed. People should be given the opportunity to 
actively participate in the process. Thus, dialogue structures are necessary. This can be 
achieved through cooperation among different national and international actors.  
  
Página 52 de 55 
 
Bibliography:  
 
Ackermann, A. (2003). The idea and practice of conflict prevention. Journal of Peace 
Research, 40(3), 339–347. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343303040003006. 
Ayres Pinto, D. J. (2014). Mediação de conflitos no âmbito internacional: premissas e 
modelo de ação. Revista Do Advogado, No 123, 152–161. 
Bazirake, J. B., & Zimmermann, G. (2018). Peace Profile: Marshall Rosenberg. Peace 
Review, 30(2), 246–253. https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2018.1458970. 
Bellamy, A. & Reike, R. (2010). The Responsibility to Protect and International Law. 
Global Responsibility to Protect, 2(3), 267–286. 
https://doi.org/10.1163/187598410X500390. 
Bercovitch, J., & Rubin Z., J. (Eds.). (2003). Mediation in International Relations. 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412959636.n352. 
Bush, R. A. B., & Pope, S. (2002). Changing the quality of conflict interaction: The 
principles and practice of transformative mediation. Pepperdine Dispute Resolution 
Law Journal, 3(1), 67–96.  
Byers, M. (2008). International Law. In Historicism and the Human Sciences in Victorian 
Britain. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.003.0035. 
Carment, David & Schnabel, Albrecht. (2003). Conflict prevention – Taking stock, in 
The United Nations University. (2003). Conflict prevention: path to peace or grand 
illusion? (D. Carment & A. Schnabel, Eds.). United Nations University Press. 
Cassese, A. (2001). International Law. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 
Cronogue, G. (2012). Responsibility to Protect: Syria the Law, Politics, and Future of 
Humanitarian Intervention Post-Libya. Journal of International Humanitarian 
Legal Studies, 3(1), 124–159. https://doi.org/10.1163/18781527-00301004. 
Diehl, P. F. (2016). Thinking about Peace Negative Terms versus Positive Outcomes. 
Strategic Studies Quarterly, 10(1), 3–9. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271085. 
Doughty, K. (2014). Our Goal Is Not to Punish but to Reconcile: Mediation in 
Página 53 de 55 
 
Postgenocide Rwanda. American Anthropologist, Vol. 116, No. 4, pp. 780–794. 
Greirg, J. M., & Diehl, P. F. (2012). International Mediation. Polity Press. 
Guilfoyle, D. (2016). International Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, 2016.  
Igrapé Institute. (2018). The Handbook of Conflict Prevention (pp. 1–40). pp. 1–40.  
Jentleson, B. (2003). The realism of preventive statecraft, In The United Nations 
University. (2003). Conflict prevention: path to peace or grand illusion? (D. 
Carment & A. Schnabel, Eds.). United Nations University Press. 26-46.  
Kenny, C.; Butler, S. (2018). The legality of intervention by invitation in situations of r2p 
violations. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 51(1), 
135-178. 
Lederach, J. (2014). The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. Good Books; Original 
ed. (2003). 
Lopes, J. (2003), Entre Solidão e Intervencionismo, Direito de Autodeterminação dos 
Povos e Reações de Estados Terceiros, col. Gabinete de estudos internacionais, 
Porto: Publicações Universidade Católica – Porto. 
Lund, M. S. (2009). Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice AN 
IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME AND GONE? The Sage Handbook of Conflict 
Resolution, 35.  
Mani, R., & Ponzio, R. (2018). Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflict Prevention. 
In T. G. Weiss & S. Daws (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Vol. 
1). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803164.013.22. 
Marshall B. Rosenberg, P. D. (2005). Speak Peace in a World of Conflict: What You Say 
Next Will Change Your World (1st ed.; D. (CopyProof) Shenk, Ed.). Enci nitas, CA.: 
PruddleDancer Press. 
Monteiro, A. (2000). As Nações Unidas e a prevenção de conflitos. Nação e Defesa. 
Outono-Inverno 2000. Nº 95/96 – 2.ª Série. pp. 55-67. 
Naime, M. (2012). Libya and Resolution 1973: The Law of Politics. Journal of Strategic 
Security, 5(2), 105–112. https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.6. 
Nasu, H. (2009). Operationalizing the “responsibility to protect” and conflict prevention: 
Dilemmas of civilian protection in armed conflict. Journal of Conflict and Security 
Página 54 de 55 
 
Law, 14(2), 209–241. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krp017. 
Nolte, G. (1999). Intervention upon Invitation – Use of Force by Foreign Troops in 
Internal Conflicts at the Invitation of a Government under International Law. 
Springer, Berlin. 
Nolte, G. (2005). Sovereignty as Responsibility? Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
(American Society of International Law), 99, 389-392.  
Orakhelashvili, Alexander. (2019). Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. 
8th Edition, Routledge, Oxon. 
Pruitt, D. (2005). Escalation, Readiness for Negotiation, and Third-Party Functions. In 
Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts. Zartman, I., Faure, G. (Ed.). 
Cambridge University Press., 251-270. 
Ramsbotham, Oliver; Woodhouse, T. M. H. (2005). CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS. 
In Blackwell Publishing Professional (Ed.), Contemporary Conflict Resolution (2nd 
ed., p. 399).  
Rosenberg, M. (2005). Speak Peace in a World of Conflict: What you Say Next Will 
Change Your World. Centre for Nonviolent Communication. PuddleDancer Press. 
Sharma, S. & Welsh, J. (2015). Introduction, in Oxford University Press 2015. (2015). 
The Responsibility to Prevent. In S. K. Sharma & J. M. Welsh (Eds.), The 
Responsibility to Prevent, 1-20. 
Sluiter, G. (2009). Cooperation of States with International Criminal Tribunals. In The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice. (2009). Antonio Cassese 
(Ed.), 187-200.  
Strauss, E. (2015). Institutional Capacities of the United Nations to Prevent and Halt 
Atrocity Crimes, in Oxford University Press 2015. (2015). The Responsibility to 
Prevent. In S. K. Sharma & J. M. Welsh (Eds.), The Responsibility to Prevent, 38-
82. 
Tavares, M. (2015). Guerra e Responsabilidade: a intervenção militar no Iraque em 2003. 
Porto: Publicações Universidade Católica - Porto.  
Tomuschat, C. (2002). Ch. VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Article 33. In The Charter 
of the United Nations: A Commentary. Bruno Simma [et al.] (Ed). 2nd ed. Oxford: 
Página 55 de 55 
 
Oxford University, cop. 2002 (reimp. 2010). 2 vol.; 25 cm. ISBN 978-0-19-925377-
7 (set).  
United Nations. Codification Division. (1992). Handbook on the peaceful settlement of 
disputes between states. 
Wehr, P., & Lederach, J. P. (1991). Mediating Conflict in Central America. Journal of 
Peace Research, 28(no.1), 85–98. 
Wyler, E. & Castellanos-Jankiewicz, L. (2014). In Serious Breaches of Peremptory 
Norms. In Nollkaemper, A., & Plakokefalos, I. (2014). Principles of shared 
responsibility in international law: An appraisal of the state of the art. In Principles 
of Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art. 
284, 311. 
 
LINKS: 
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-49421110. – last consulted on 
18/10/2019. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/06/its-not-us-embargo-new-
venezuela-sanctions-are-all-about-citgo/.– last consulted on 18/10/2019. 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sgsm19688.doc.htm.– last consulted on 18/10/2019. 
https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/09/07/america/1567824876_031923.html. – last 
consulted on 18/10/2019. 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1048012. – last consulted on 18/10/2019. 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13771.doc.htm. – last consulted on 18/10/2019. 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/uttalelse_venezuela/id2652785/. – last consulted 
on 18/10/2019. 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/statement-on-venezuela-2-august-
2019/id2663576/.– last consulted on 18/10/2019. 
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-49273326. – last consulted on 
18/10/2019. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877. – last consulted on 
18/10/2019. 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13771.doc.htm. – last consulted on 18/10/2019 
https://data.humdata.org/group/ven. – last consulted on 18/10/2019. 
https://ucdp.uu.se/. – last consulted on 6/08/2019. 
